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1. Outline
Edith Piaf is famous for her chanson “Non, je ne regrette rien”. I suggest that rational
people should not violate Piaf’s ‘No Regrets’ maxim; a rational person should not be able to
fore-see that she will regret her decisions.  In section 2 I formulate a principle, Desire Reflection,
which is a version of Piaf’s maxim. In section 3 I argue that standard evidential decision theory
violates this principle. In section 4 I argue that standard causal decison theory does not violate it.
In section 5 I discuss whether a couple of variations on these standard decision theories satisfy
Desire Reflection. In section 6 I make a suggestion for how causal decision theorists should pick
what they consider to be the relevant causal situations. In section 7 I discuss the ‘If you’re so
smart, why ain’t cha rich’ objection to causal decision theory, and dismiss it. In section 8 I
discuss a more serious problem for causal decision theory, namely ‘Decision Instability’, and
argue that it is a real problem. In section 9 I develop deliberational decision theory in order to
escape Decision Instability. In section 10 I discuss the connection between deliberational
decision theory and game theory. I end with some conclusions. 
2. Desire Reflection
Bas van Fraassen has suggested that any rational person P should satisfy the following principle,
which I will call “Belief Reflection”: at any time t1 person P’s credence (subjective probability,
degree of belief)  in a proposition X should equal P’s expectation value at t1 for P’s credence in
2X at any later time t2. 
Belief Reflection Crt1(X)=Et1(Crt2(X)). 
Let me now introduce an analogous principle concerning desires, which I will call “Desire
Reflection”. Let Dest(X) denote the desirability of X for person P at time t. What exactly “the
desirability of X for person P at time t” should be taken to be is in part what is at issue in this
paper. For now, the reader should just take P’s desirability to be a quantity which corresponds to
the strength of desire that person P at time t has for X, and take it that numerical representations
of desirabilities (for a person at a time) are unique up to positive linear transformations. Desire
Reflection then demands that the expectation value of future desirability must equal current
desirability
 
Desire Reflection Dest1(X)=Et1(Dest2(X)). 
Another way to put this is: one should not be such that one can foresee that one’s future desires
will differ from one’s current ones in such a way that one will later regret earlier decisions. So
Desire Reflection is just an instance of Piaf’s ‘No Regrets’ maxim. 
Having just stated Desire Reflection, let me immediately make a qualification. One might
maintain that cross-time comparisons of desirability make no sense. That is to say, one may think
that the question as to whether a claim such as Dest1(X)=Dest2(X) is true or not makes no sense,
since there are no facts about cross-time equality of desirabilities. For instance, one might think
3that the desirabilities at a time t of various options is nothing but a representation of one’s
preferences at t over these options, so that desirabilities at times are only defined up to positive
linear transformation. One might infer from this that the relation between the desirabilities at two
different times is only defined up to positive linear transformations. On the other hand, one
might claim that cross-time equality of desirability does make sense. For instance, one might
claim that the desirability of a complete possible world W has to be equal at all times:
Dest1(W)=Dest2(W) for all times t1  and t2  and all complete worlds W, and one might then try to
argue that it follows that equality of desirability across times in general makes sense. For
purposes of this paper I will not take a stand on this issue. I will take Desire Reflection to be the
demand that there exist an allowed numerical representation of desirabilities at all times such
that Dest1(X)=Et1Dest2(X) for all pairs of times t1 and t2 such that t2 is later than t1.  
Is Desire Reflection a plausible demand? It seems to me that it is. Violations of Belief
Reflection are closely tied to the possibility of being money pumped, and so too are violations of
Desire Reflection. For instance, suppose that the default arrangement is that you get orange juice
each morning from the stand outside one’s front door. But suppose that according to your current
desirabilities you would rather get coffee than orange juice two days from now. Indeed, suppose
that, other things being equal, you now think it worth 10 cents to get coffee rather than orange
juice two days from now. But suppose that you also know that tomorrow you will think it more
desirable to get orange juice rather than coffee the day after tomorrow, indeed that tomorrow,
other things being equal, you will find the difference worth 10 cents. Then it seems that the
merchant at the stand can make money off you by having you pay 10 cents today to switch your
4order, for two days from now, to coffee, and then tomorrow have you pay another 10 cents to
switch it back. Of course, since all of this is foreseeable to you, you might wisely decide not to
pay today to switch, since you can see you will end up switching back anyhow, so it will cost
you 20 cents, and you will end up with the default prospect anyhow. Well even if there is such an
escape from being money pumped, it still seems that there is something deeply worrying about
having such foreseeable switches in desires. Note, for instance, the similarity with problems such
as violations of transitivity of preferences. Prima facie it seems irrational to prefer A to B and
prefer B to C but prefer C to A. One way of arguing that this is so is to argue that if you violate
transitivity you can be money pumped. For suppose the status quo is that you get A. It would
seem a merchant can make money of you by first having you pay to switch from A to C, then
having you pay money to switch from C to B, and finally having you pay money to switch from
B to A. Of course, if you know the merchant is going to make you this sequence of offers, you
might wisely refuse the initial offer. Depending a bit on how preferences are supposed to be
related to actual choices, this is a quite coherent response. But even if it is, it still seems that
there is something deeply worrying about intransitive preferences. Analogously, it seems there is
something deeply worrying about violations of desire reflection.
Now, what one thinks of Desire Reflection in general does not matter that much for my
current purposes, since for purposes of this paper I will not need to use it in its full generality. I
will only impose what I will call ‘Weak Desire Reflection’. Weak Desire Reflection is the
demand that violations of Desire Reflection should not be brought about merely by
conditionalisation upon evidence. This principle seems eminently plausible to me. Let me try to
convince the reader of this by giving an additional argument for Weak Desire Reflection. 
51 By standard evidential decision theory I mean Jeffrey-style decision theory (see Jeffrey
1983), i.e. a decision theory which uses probabilities of outcomes conditional upon acts, not
Savage-style unconditional probabilities (see Savage 1972). I will discuss Savage style decision
theory in section 5.
Suppose you have a friend who has the same initial degrees of belief and the same
utilities as you have. Suppose your friend acquires additional information, but he is not allowed
to give you the information. He is only allowed to advise you how to act. Surely you should
follow his advice. Now consider your future self. If your future self has more information than
you do, surely you should listen to her advice, surely you should trust her assessment of the
desirabilities of your possible actions. So, surely, your current desirabilities should equal the
expectation value of your future desirabilities in cases in which your future self differs from you
only in that she has updated her credences on new information. But this is just what Weak Desire
Reflection says.
3. Standard evidential decision theory violates Weak Desire Reflection
Let me start by recalling Newcombe’s puzzle. Mary has to choose between grabbing box A, and
grabbing boxes A and B. Whichever Mary grabs, she gets the contents. Box B contains $1 for
sure. A very reliable predictor P of Mary’s choices has put nothing in Box A if P predicted Mary
would grab both boxes, and has put $10 in box A if he predicted Mary would only grab box A. 
Standard evidential decision theory1 says that Mary should maximize her expected utility.
The expected utility of an act Ai is defined as 
EU(Ai)=3jCr(Oj/Ai)U(Oj) 
Here the Oj  are the possible outcomes and U(Oj) is the utility of outcome Oj. Let us suppose that
6Mary takes it that the predictor is 90% reliable, i.e. 
Cr($0 in A/grab both)=0.9 
Cr($10 in A/grab A)=0.9. 
And let us suppose that for Mary dollars are utilities. This implies that
EU(grab A)=0.9x10+0.1x0=9
EU(grab both)=0.9x1+0.1x11=2
So, according to evidential decision theory Mary should pick box A. 
Now let me slightly modify the case. Suppose that Mary has to make her choice by
typing which box, or boxes, she picks into a computer.  An hour from now the game-master will
read what she typed in, open the relevant box or boxes and give her the money. Suppose also that
Mary will be shown the contents of the boxes after she has typed her choice in, but before her
instruction is read by the game master.  What will her expected utilities be after she has seen the
contents? Let us assume that she will believe what she sees, i.e. she will be certain that the
amounts that she sees are actually in the boxes, and let us assume that when she sees the contents
she will not completely trust her memory, i.e. she will not be completely certain as to which
choice she made half an hour ago. There are two possibilities for what she sees. 
First let us suppose she sees nothing in box A. Then 
EU(A)=Prob(0 in A)U(A & 0 in A)+Prob(10 in A)U(A & 10 in A)=1x0+0x10=0
EU(both)=Prob(0 in A)U(both & 0 in A)+Prob(10 in A)U(both & 10 in A)=1x1+0x11=1
So in that case EU(grab both) is higher.
Suppose, on the other hand, she sees $10 in A. Then
EU(A)=Prob(0 in A)U(A & 0 in A)+Prob(10 in A)U(A & 10 in A)=0x0+1x10=10
72  One might prefer to think of them as her expected utilities for news concerning her
actions, rather than for her actions per se, but still, they exist.
3 I didn’t do it that way in the current example, since, once the contents of the boxes has
been seen the EDT’r and the CDT’r make the same choices, so that it would no longer be an
example of the CDT’r and EDT’r making different choices.  
EU(both)=Prob(0 in A)U(both & 0 in A)+Prob(10 in A)U(both & 10 in
A)=0x1+1x11=11
So, in that case too, EU(grab) both is higher . 
So, no matter what information she gets, after she updates on that information EU(both)
is higher. And Mary knows this beforehand. That is to say, at the earlier time EU(both) is lower,
and yet she knows at the earlier time that at the later time EU(both) will be higher. So she
violates Weak Desire Reflection. 
Now, you might object that the later EU’s make no sense since it makes no sense to
attribute expected utilities to past acts. Let me respond to that in two ways. In the first place,
formally, they do. Mary has degrees of belief and utilities at the later time, so her EU’s, as
defined by the usual formula, exist.2 In the second place, one can come up with scenarios in
which the expected utilities of future actions changes due to information that one gets before the
actions have taken place, and one can come up with scenarios like that in which desire reflection
will fail for evidential decision theorists.3
Formally, what is going on is the following. According to evidential decision theory, one
should maximize expected utility EU(Ai)=3jCr(Oj/Ai)U(Oj). When one gets new information,
one’s credences are updated by conditionalisation. So one’s conditional credences Cr(Oj/Ai) will
change. How will they change? Well, that depends on what bit of information one gets. Before
84 In the next section I will discuss Joyce-style Causal Decision Theory which makes use
of probabilities that are “imaged” on acts, rather than probabilities of causal situations.   
one gets the new bit of information one can not know what one’s future credences will be, but
one can calculate the expectation value of one’s future credences. What is the expectation value
of one’s future conditional credences? The expectation value of future one’s future conditional
credence is 
E(Cr’(Oj/Ai))=3kCr(Ik)Cr(Oj/Ai &Ik). 
Here Cr(Ik) is one’s current credence that one will get information Ik, and the set of the possible
bits of information {Ik} forms what I will call an ‘information partition’. Now, this expectation
value does not generally equal one’s current conditional credence, i.e. it is not generally true that
E(Cr’(Oj/Ai))=Cr(Oj/Ai), and this means that the expectation value of future expected utility does
not generally equal current expected utility. If one satisfies Belief Reflection, then the current
expectation value of one’s future unconditional probabilities must equal one’s current
unconditional probabilities. But this is not true of conditional probabilities. That is why Weak
Desire Reflection is violated by evidential decision theory. 
4. Standard causal decision theory satisfies Weak Desire Reflection
Causal decision theory, intuitively speaking, says the following: when deciding what to do, pay
attention to the extent to which your actions cause good or bad outcomes, don’t pay attention to
the extent to which your actions are evidence for good or bad outcomes. More formally, standard
causal decision theory as formulated by David Lewis, says the following.4 Start by figuring out
what all the possible causal situations K are that you could be in. Call the set of possible causal
9situations {K} the “causal situation partition”. Then for each possible causal situation K in the
partition, figure out what the expected utility 
EUK(A)=3jCr(Oj/A&K)U(Oj) 
of each of your acts is. Then, since you typically do not know in which causal situation your are
in, average out these expected utilities weighted by your credences in the causal situations in
order to get the causal utilities 
CU(A)=3KCr(K)EUK(A) 
of your acts. Causal decision theory says that you should perform an act that has maximal causal
utility. 
Now, different people have slightly different ideas as to what counts as a causal situation.
The basic idea is that a causal situation determines exactly how the future outcomes causally
depend on your acts.  More specifically, according to some it is a list of counterfactuals,
according to some it is a list of laws of development and facts about the current state, and there
are yet other ideas. I will not take a stand on this issue, since it does not matter much for my
purposes exactly what a causal situation is. 
We know enough to check whether causal decision theory satisfies Weak Desire
Reflection. Let’s start with the standard Newcombe case. In this case all hands agree that the
possible causal situations are: “There is $0 in box A” and “There is $10 in box A”. Now
EU$0(both)=1
EU$0(A)=0
EU$10(both)=11
EU$0(A)=10
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So, in each possible causal situation EU(both) is higher than EU(A). So, no matter what one’s
credence in each possible causal situation, CU(both) is higher than CU(A). So causal decision
theory says: pick both. 
How about Weak Desire Reflection? Well, notice that there is no possible bit of
information that can affect the expected utilities of any particular act in any particular causal
situation: every act-causal situation pair uniquely determines an outcome. The only thing that
information can do is change one’s (unconditional) credences in the possible causal situations.
But, by Belief Reflection one’s current expectation of one’s future (unconditional) credences
must equal one’s current (unconditional) credence. It immediately follows that the expectation
value of the future causal utility of any act must equal the current causal utility of that act. So
causal decision theorists in a Newcombe situation must satisfy Weak Desire Reflection.  
Let me generalize this point. It is obviously generally true that if every act-causal
situation pair uniquely determines an outcome, then Weak Desire Reflection is satisfied by a
causal decision theorist. So, in so far as one agrees that one ought not to violate Weak Desire
Reflection one has reason to have a conception of causal situations which is fine-grained enough
that any possible causal situation K in conjunction with any possible act A uniquely determines
the outcome. 
However, sometimes, one can not plausibly have that. For instance, suppose that one
thinks that the world is indeterministic. Then, it might be that a causal situation in conjunction
with an act does not uniquely determine the outcome  Even then, though, one can satisfy Weak
Desire Reflection relative to any information that one thinks one could possibly acquire prior to
one’s act. 
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Let me be explain. Suppose that one takes as one’s causal situations K certain features of
the world up until the time t that the actions are to take place, and that the K are such that
conjoined with any action A they determine the chances of each possible outcome, and that one
knows what these chances are. I.e. suppose one has credence 1 in a particular conditional chance
function, Chance(Oi/K&A), and that one has credence 1 that 
Chance(Oi/K&A)=Chance(Oi/K&A&X) 
for any proposition X about the state of the world up until time t. Now, the so-called Principal
Principle (another eminently plausible principle of rationality) says that one’s credences ought to
equal what one takes to be the chances. That is to say, the Principal Principle dictates in such a
situation that: 
Cr(Oi/K&A&X)=Chance(Oi/K&A&X)=Chance(Oi/K&A)=Cr(Oi/K&A).  
Now let’s look at Weak Desire Reflection. What is the expectation value of your causal utilities
conditional upon some information partition {Im}? Well, your causal utilities are 
CU(A)=3K,jCr(K)Cr(Oj/A&K)U(Oj). 
So your expected causal utilities conditional upon {Im} are
ECU(A)=3K,j,mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)Cr(Oj/A&K&Im)U(Oj). 
Now suppose that for each K, j term separately we could show that
3mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)Cr(Oj/A&K&Im)U(Oj)=Cr(K)Cr(Oj/A&K)U(Oj). 
Then it would follow that  
3K,j,mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)Cr(Oj/A&K&Im)U(Oj)=3K,j,Cr(K)Cr(Oj/A&K)U(Oj)
So we would have shown that 
ECU(A)=CU(A).
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Well, let us suppose that each Im is a bit of information about the state of the world prior to t.
Then we know that 
Cr(Oj/A&K&Im)=Cr(Oj/A&K). 
But if that is the case then 
3mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)Cr(Oj/A&K&Im)U(Oj)=3mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)Cr(Oj/A&K)U(Oj). 
But we know by Belief Reflection that 
3mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)=Cr(K). 
So we have that 
3mCr(Im)Cr(K/Im)Cr(Oj/A&K&Im)U(Oj)=Cr(K)Cr(Oj/A&K)U(Oj). 
So in that case one must satisfy Weak Desire Reflection relative to any information one could
possibly get prior to one’s action.
So, once again, in so far as one has reason to satisfy Weak Desire Reflection, one has
reason to have a conception of causal situations K which is fine-grained enough that any K
conjoined with an act A determines the chances of the outcomes Oj.
5 Joyce-style and Savage-style decision theories and Weak Desire Reflection.
Let me now very briefly discuss a couple of variations on what I have called standard 
evidential decision theory and standard causal decision theory, and see how they fare with
respect to Weak Desire Reflection. 
Jim Joyce (in Joyce 1999) has suggested defining the causal utility of an act as follows:
 CU(A)=3WCrA(W)U(W)
Here we are summing over possible worlds W, and CrA(-) is one’s credence ‘imaged’ on act A.
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What is it to ‘image’ a credence Cr on an act A, or, more generally, on an arbitrary  proposition
C? The basic idea is as follows: when ‘imaging’ on proposition C you are supposing that C is
true and adjusting your credence in the most plausible way to accommodate that supposition.
Obviously,  you will have to shift all your credence onto worlds in which C is true. But you also
want to make C true in the most ‘plausible’ way. A natural way to implement this is as follows.
When considering what to do with your credence in a world W in which C is false, you want to
shift you credence in W to the closest possible world in which C is true. Now there may not be a
unique closest such world, so you will in general have to shift your credence in W to some set of
worlds close to W in which C is true. In order for this to have a well-defined effect, you will
have to specify how your credence in W gets apportioned among the worlds in this set. Such a
proportionality assignment can formally be represented by a function DC(X,W) which tells you
what proportion of your credence in world W will be attached to worlds in which proposition X
is true when you image your credences on proposition C. It follows that when you image some
initial credence Cr on C, then after imaging your credence in proposition X will be 
CrC(X)=EWCr(W)DC(X,W).
Now let us see whether the expectation value of Joyce-style causal utility under an information
partition equals one’s current causal utility.  Well, the expectation value of Joyce-style causal
utility on information partition {Im} is
ECU(A)=E(3WCr(W)DC(X,W)U(W)=3W, mCr(Im)Cr(W/Im)DC(X,W)U(W), 
provided that the function DC(X,W) does not change when you acquire new information. In that
case it follows from Belief Reflection that 
ECU(A)=3W, mCr(Im)Cr(W/Im)DC(X,W)U(W)=3WCr(W)DC(X,W)U(W)=CU(A).
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5 One might baulk at the demand that such pairs always uniquely determine an outcome.
What if the world is indeterministic? Well, one can, by convention, simply beef up the notion of
a situation so that any situation S conjoined with any act A uniquely determines an outcome O.
Of course, it is then not plausible that what situation one is in is determined by the intrinsic state
of the world at the time of one’s action. Still, one might hope that this does not harm the
applicability or plausibility of Savage-style decision theory. Unfortunately, we will soon see that
there is a problem as to what one takes situations to be, indeed that without a further constraint
on what can count as a situation Savage-style decision theory is unsatisfactory. 
So, if the ‘way’ in which you shift your credences around when you image on an action A does
not change when you acquire new information, it follows that a Joyce-style causal decision
theorist will satisfy Weak Desire Reflection. So, in so far as one agrees that one has reason to
satisfy Weak Desire Refection, one has reason to keep DC(X,W) invariant under information
acquisition.
Now let’s turn to Savage-style decision theory (see Savage 1972). In Savage-style
decision theory one assumes that one has divided propositions up into three distinct categories,
those describing actions A, those describing situations S, and those describing outcomes O. The
actions A amount to maps from situations S to outcomes O, i.e. each action-situation pair
determines a unique outcome.5 The Savage-utility of an act then is defined as
EU(A)=ESCr(S)U(O), where O is the outcome determined by A and S. Since only unconditional
credences Cr(S) occur in this formula, it follows from Belief Reflection that Savage-style
decision theory satisfies Weak Desire Reflection. So, why not simply adopt Savage-style
decision theory? Why bother with the somewhat baroque business of causal decision theory?
Well, in effect causal decision theory, Lewis-style, just is a Savage-style decision theory, one
with a particular suggestion for what the situations S should be, namely causal situations. Let me
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now quickly explain why one has to do something like that, why one can not just take Savage-
style decision theory, and put no constraints on what the situations S are. 
Consider the following case. Harry is going to bet on the outcome of a Yankees versus
Red Sox game. Harry’s credence that the Yankees will win is 0.9. He is offered the following
two bets, of which he must pick one:
1) A bet on the Yankees: Harry wins $1 if the Yankees win, loses $2 if the Red Sox win
2) A bet on the Red Rox: Harry wins $2 if the Red Sox win, loses $1 if theYankees win.
Suppose Harry takes the possible situations to be:
A) Yankees win
B) Red Sox win
Then 
EU(1): 0.9x1+0.1x-2=0.7
EU(2)=0.1x2+0.9x-1=-0.7
So, unsurprisingly, Savage-style decision theory says: Harry pick the bet on the Yankees.
But now suppose that Harry take the possible situations to be:
C) I win my bet
D) I lose my bet
Then 
EU(1)=Cr(C)x1+Cr(D)x-2 
EU(2)=Cr(C)x2+Cr(D)x-1. 
It immediately follows that no matter what Cr(C) and Cr(D) are, EU(2)>EU(1). So now Savage-
style decision theory says: Harry should pick the bet on the Red Sox. In short, what action
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Savage-style decision theory mandates depends on what one takes to be the situations. To put it
another way: Savage style decision theory is not ‘partition invariant’. As it stands, Savage-style
decision theory is incoherent. 
 Jeffrey-style evidential decision theory and causal decision theory amount to two
different reactions to this problem. Causal decision theory adds the rider that one should take as
one’s situations causal situations. Jeffrey-style evidential decision theory says: don’t use
unconditional probabilities, instead use probabilities of situations conditional upon acts. In other
words, Jeffrey-style evidential decision theory solves the problem by becoming partition
invariant, while causal decision theory solves the problem by saying that there is a particular
priviliged partition. 
Now, I have argued that evidential decision theory is bad because it violates Weak Desire
Reflection, and have argued that causal decision theory satisfies it in so far as it makes use of
fine-grained partitions. However, I don’t want to say that any fine-grained partition is as good as
any other. Let me now briefly address that issue. 
6. Good and bad partitions
While one avoids violations of Weak Desire Reflection if one has fine-grained causal
situations, this does not mean that on my view any fine-grained partition is as good as any other.
Recall the example I just gave, and imagine a causal decision theorist who is repeatedly going to
be on a series of Yankees-Red Sox games. A causal decision theorist who takes as his causal
situations A and B will always bet on the Yankees. And if the Yankees indeed win 90% of the
time, he will gain an average of 70 cents per bet. On the other hand, a causal decision theorist
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who takes as his causal situations C and D will always bet on the Red Sox, and will lose an
average of 70 cents per bet. Clearly then, there is a sense in which causal partition {C,D} is a
bad partition, and {A,B} is a good partition, and this is fore-seeably so. 
But why is this so?  What is the diagnosis? The diagnosis is that {C,D} is a bad partition
because its elements C and D are correlated to the acts that one is choosing between, while the
elements of the {A,B} partition are not. Here is what I mean. Let’s suppose that we have a large
population of causal decision theorists, that 50% of them use the {A,B} partition, and 50% of
them use the {C,D} partition. So 50% will bet on the Yankees all the time, 50% will bet on the
Red Sox all the time. Suppose that the Yankees win 90% of the time. Then there will be no
correlation between the elements of the act partition (‘Bet on Yankees’, ‘Bet on Red Sox’) and
the elements of the {A,B} partition. But there will be a correlation between the elements of the
act partition (‘Bet on Yankees’, ‘Bet on Red Sox’) and the elements of {C,D} partition. For,
among all the best that are placed on the Yankees, 90% of them are placed in cases in which the
Yankees win, and among all the bets that are placed on the Red Sox, also 90% of them are
placed in cases in which the Yankees win. So there is no correlation between the act partition
and the {A,B} partition. However, among of all the bets that are placed on the Yankees 90% are
cases in which that bet wins, while among all the bets that are placed on the Red Sox, only10%
are cases in which that bet wins. This is why the {C,D} partition is a bad partition. It is not a
good idea for a rational person to determine what she should do by first looking at how she
should act in case ‘my bet wins’ is true and then look at what how she should act when ‘my bet
loses’ is true, and then average these out by her unconditional probabilities, since the likelihood
of being in a particular element of that partition is correlated to the action in question. 
18
Let me generalize this argument. The actual average value of an act A,
Av(A)=3irf(Oi/A)U(Oi). 
Here rf stands for actual relative frequency. If there is no correlation (according to the actual
relative frequencies) between A and the elements Kj of a partition {Kj}, then 
Av(A)=3irf(Oi/A)U(Oi)=Av(A)=3irf(Kj)rf(Oi/A&Kj)U(Oi). 
So, if there is no correlation between the act partition and the elements of person P’s causal
partition {Kj}, and if the credences of P match the actual relative frequencies, then if P
maximizes his causal utility, he will be maximizing his average value. But if there is such a
correlation, then P will, typically, not be maximizing his average value. So it is not a good idea
to use a causal partition which in fact is correlated to the act partition.  
Now, I do not in general want to argue that rational people will always maximize average
value. In first place they need not have the right credences. So we should at least weaken the
demand to: by the light of their own credences there had better be no correlation between the
elements of their causal partition and their act partition. But even that is too strong, I have
already argued that in the 2-box case one should be a causal decision theorist and that the
appropriate causal partition in that case is ‘$0 in A’, ‘$10 in A’. But in that case one does expect
that if there are people that choose differently, then there will be a correlation between the acts
and the element of the causal partition. And yet I maintain that that is the right causal partition.
So I don’t want to claim that rational people should always choose a causal partition which they
expect to be uncorrelated to their act partition. No, what I suggest demanding is that in the vast
majority of cases, the cases where one can avoid Weak Desire Reflection violation and yet act
just as an evidential decision theorist, one should do so, i.e. one should in normal circumstances
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choose a causal partition such that one expects that the act partition is uncorrelated to the causal
partition. 
7 If you’re so smart, why ain’t cha rich?
Now let me briefly consider, and dismiss, a well-known objection to causal decision theory,
namely the ‘if you’re so smart, which ain’t cha rich’ objection. In a Newcombe type case
evidential decision theorists will, on average, end up richer than causal decision theorists.
Moreover, it is not as if this is a surprise: evidential and causal decision theorists can foresee that
this will happen. Given also that it is axiomatic that money, or utility, is what is strived for in
these cases, it seems hard to maintain that causal decision theorists are rational
Let me combat this argument by giving an example where the shoe is on the other foot.
We can get such a case by slightly modifying the Yankees-Red Sox example.
Let Mary be an evidential decision theorist (Jeffrey-style) who is to bet repeatedly on the
outcome of a sequence of Yankees versus Red Sox games. As in the earlier case, Mary is
convinced that in the long run the Yankees will win 90% of the time.  However, on each
occasion just before she chooses which bet to place, a perfect predictor of her choices and of the
outcomes of the games accounces to ger whether she will win her bet or lose it. Here is what
ensues. 
On some occasions the predictor says “Mary, you will lose your next bet”. After Mary
has updated her credences on this information she calculates:
EU(bet Y)=Cr(Y win/bet Y)U(Y win & bet Y)+Cr(Y lose/bet Y)U(Y lose & bet Y)=-2
EU(bet R)=Cr(R win/bet R)U(R win & bet R)+Cr(R lose/bet R)U(R lose & bet R)=-1
20
6 I am assuming that he does not know he is a causal decision theorist, indeed that he has
no credences about which bet he will take out when he calculates his causal utilities. 
So she bets on the Red Sox each time she is told she will lose her bet.
On the other occasions she is told “you will win you next bet”. She updates her credences and
finds:
EU(bet Y)=Cr(Y win/bet Y)U(Y win & bet Y)+Cr(Y lose/bet Y)U(Y lose & bet Y)=1
EU(bet R)=Cr(R win/bet R)U(R win & bet R)+Cr(R lose/bet R)U(R lose & bet R)=2
So she also bets on the Red Sox each time she is told she will win her bet. So Mary will always
bet on the Red Sox. And, if the Yankees indeed win 90% of the time, she will lose money, big
time.  Now, of course, she would have done much better had she just ignored the
announcements, and  bet on the Yankees each time. But, being an evidential decision theorist she
can not do this. 
A causal decision theorist, on the other hand, who uses the “Yankees win”, “Yankees
lose” partition, will will always bet on the Yankees, even given the “you win” “you lose”
information.6 For: 
CU(bet Y)=Cr(Y win)EUYwin(bet Y)+Cr(Y lose)EUYlose(bet Y)=0.9x1+0.1x-2=0.7
CU(bet R)=Cr(Y win)EUYwin(bet R)+Cr(Y lose)EUYlose(bet R)=0.9x-1+0.1x2=-0.7.
So there are cases in which causal decision theorists, predictably, will do better than evidential
decision theorists. 
Let me give one more example. Consider again a Newcombe situation. Now suppose that
the situation is that one makes a choice after one has seen the contents of the boxes, but that the
predictor still rewards people who, insanely, choose only box A even after they have seen the
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7 This example is from Egan (forthcoming). Similar examples can be found in Weirich
(1985), Gibbard and Harper (1978) and Richter (1984). 
contents of the boxes. What will happen? Evidential decision theorists and causal decision
theorists will always see nothing in box A and will always pick both boxes. Insane people will
see $10 in box A and $1 in box B and pick box A only.  So insane people will end up richer than
causal decision theorists and evidential decision theorists, and all hands can foresee that insanity
will be rewarded. This hardly seems an argument that insane people are more rational than either
of them are. Let me turn to a better argument against causal decision theory.
8 Decision instability problems for causal decision theory
Johnny has a button in front of him such that if he presses it all psychos will die.7 Other things
equal he wants to kill all psychos, but other things are not equal: he really does not want to die
himself. Other than that he does not care whether he is a psycho. Indeed, let us suppose that his
utilities are as follows: 
Upsycho(push)= !100 
Upsycho(not-push)= 10
Unot-psycho(push)= 0 
Unot-psycho(not-push)= 0
Johnny thinks it very unlikely that he is a psycho:
Cr(I am a psycho)=0.01 
But he thinks that pushing the button would be good evidence that he is a psycho:
Cr(I am a psycho/I push)=0.9
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Cr(I am a psycho/I don’t push)=0
. What should he do? 
Let’s assume that the causal situations are ‘Johnny is a psycho’ and ‘Johnny is not a
psycho’. Let Johnny’s utilities be as follows:
Upsycho(push)= !100 
Upsycho(not-push)= 10
Upsycho(push)= 0.9 
Upsycho(not-push)= 0
It follows that CU(push)=0.01x-100+0.99x10= 8.9, and CU(not-push)=0. 
Note that as far as this calculation is concerned his credence in being a psycho
conditional on pushing and conditional on not pushing are irrelevant. Some people’s intuitions
say that this should not be irrelevant, indeed that in this situation it would be unwise for Johnny
to push, since if he were to decide to push he would have good reason to believe that he is a
psycho, and hence he should think it likely that he will die. Now, I don’t have strong intuitions
here. Moreover, the case does not seem that different from Newcombe type cases, so that I can
certainly see a causal decision theorist maintaining that since pushing is merely evidence for
Johnny being a psycho, and does not cause him to be a psycho, Johnny should ignore his
conditional credences and indeed push. 
However, it seems to me that there is a different objection to causal decision theory that
this case elicits, namely a violation of Edith Piaf’s maxim which does not occur in the standard
Newcombe case.  Here is what I mean. Suppose that Johnny, being a good causal decision
theorist has made the decision to push. Suppose he has not pushed yet, but he is sure he will do
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8 Can one escape this problem by adopting Jeffrey-style evidential decision theory? That
depends. If one assumes that all that one learns when one has come to a decision is what one will
do, and if one always updates by conditionalisation, and if even in the extreme case where one
knows which act one will perform with certainty the conditional probabilities upon not doing
that act are still well-defined (i.e. if one allows conditionalisation on credence 0 propositions),
then one will not regret one’s decision once it is made. But if not, then even the evidential
decision theorist can be in a situation where he must regret his decision as soon as he has made
it. The crux here is whether the conditional credences Cr(Oi/A) can change as a result of
deliberation. Note that this possibility is exactly what Jeffrey invoked when he gave his
‘ratificationism’ defense of evidential decision theory in Newcombe type cases (see Jeffrey
1983, section 1.7), and what others invoked when they gave a ‘tickle’ defense of evidential
decision theory in gene G type cases (see e.g. Eells 1982).
so. Since Johnny has a credence of 0.9 in being a psycho conditional on pushing, once he has
become convinced that he will push, he should increase his degree of belief that he is a psycho to
0.9. But now, given his updated credences, he can re-calculate the causal utilities of pushing and
of not pushing, and he will find that now the causal utility of not pushing is significantly higher
than that of pushing. To be precise, now
CU(push)=0.9x-100+0.1x10= -80
CU(not-push)=0.
So, as soon as he has made his decision and has updated his credences on the basis of his
decision, he will regret it. So he will violate Piaf’s maxim. Indeed, no matter what decision he
makes, as soon as he has incorporated that decision in his credences, he will regret the decision.
So a causal decision theorist in a Psycho Johnny situation can not but violate Piaf’s maxim.
What to do? 8  
9 Deliberational decision theory
Here is what I suggest. Allow what game theorists have been allowing for a long time: so-called
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‘mixed decisions’, i.e. decisions to do certain acts with certain probabilities. Now, how one
should understand the notion of a ‘mixed decision’ is a somewhat vexing issue. I will sketch the
view of mixed decisions that I am inclined towards, while at the same time admitting that I am
not entirely convinced that this is the right view to take. Indeed I am not completely happy about
having to resort to ‘mixed decisions’ at all. The reason that I nonetheless will do so is that armed
with it one can give a natural solution to problems of decision instability (such as are brought out
by Psycho Johnny type cases) and that it will also allow a natural unification of decision
theoretic rationality and game theoretic rationality. This gives me some hope that something
fairly close to what I suggest in this paper could be right.
OK, so here is the view of mixed decisions that I incline towards. My tentative view is
that to make a certain mixed decision is just to have certain credences in one’s acts at the end of
a rational deliberation. On this view, mixed decisions are not decisions to perform certain acts
with certain probabilities.  Now, my tentative view is admittedly an odd view. For on this view
rationality constrains what credences one should have at the end of a deliberation. Decision
theory, on this view, does not evaluate the rationality of actions. Rather it evaluates the
rationality of credences in actions. On this understanding of mixed acts decision theory is theory
of what credences one ought to have in one’s actions, it is not a theory that tells one which
actions are rational and which are not, nor does it even evaluate how rational each possible act is.
This, I admit, is odd, to say the least. So why do I adopt this view?
Here’s why. The natural alternative view is that a mixed decision is a decision to perform
certain acts Ai with a certain probabilities pi. But what is it to decide to perform certain acts Ai 
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9 See, especially, Skyrms 1990.
with a certain probabilities pi? A natural suggestion would be that one does this just in case one
has a chance device at one’s disposal, where one can delegate responsibility of which act is to be
performed to this chance device, and one can set the chances with which this chance device will
act on one’s behalf to values pi of one’s choosing. However, in the first place we are hardly ever
in a situation in which we can perform such actions. (It is not as if one has such a chance device
stored away in some convenient part of one’s brain.) In the second place, even if we did it would
amount to a different decision situation, namely one in which we have an uncountable infinity of
pure acts that we can perform, the acts being the possible ways we have of setting the chance
‘dials’ of the chance device.  In short, I find the natural alternative view implausible and/or
useless.  So let me soldier on with my view, while noting that I am not entirely happy with it. 
Let me now show how armed with mixed decisions we can make sure we can stop
violating Piaf’s maxim. Before I do so, let me point out that the rest of this paper amounts to
little more than an exposition of some of Brian Skyrms’ work.9 
The basic idea is very simple. Johnny starts his deliberation with certain credences that
he is a psycho and certain credences that he will push. He then does a causal utility calculation.
He finds the causal utility of pushing is higher than that of not pushing. But rather than that he
immediately becomes certain that he will push, he merely increases his credence that he will
push. In the light of this he increases his credence that he is a psycho. Armed with these new
credences he recalculates causal utilities. Armed with the result he resets his credences in
pushing the button. And so on, until he reaches credences which are at equilibrium, i.e.
credences which are such that his own rules tell him not to change them anymore. Given the
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10 A similar idea can be found in Weirich 1985.
11 That is to say, the most natural way in which to do this is to ‘Jeffrey-conditionalise’
relative to the action partition.
utilities and conditional credences that I stated, this will occurs when Cr(Push)=10/110,
Cr(Psycho)=9/110. I claim that if Johnny is rational, these are the credences that he will have at
the end of his deliberation.10
In general I claim that a rational person is one such that at the end of his deliberation as
to which action to perform his credences are in equilibrium. Let me dub this theory
‘deliberational decision theory’. Let me also define ‘deliberational causal decision theory’ and
‘deliberational evidential decision theory’. Deliberational causal decision theory additionally
demands that one’s update rule is such that it increases the credence only of actions whose causal
utility is greater than the status quo, and it raises the sum of the probabilities of all acts with
causal utility greater than the status quo. Deliberational evidential decision theory demands that
one’s update rule be such that it increases the credence only of actions whose evidential utility is
greater than the status quo and it raises the sum of the probabilities of all acts which with
evidential utility greater than the status quo. I advocate being a deliberational causal decision
theorist. 
Now let me make some clarifications. First clarification: how does one update one’s
credences in situations given how one has just updated one’s credences in one’s actions? The
natural way to do this is to keep one’s credence in any proposition X conditional upon one’s
actions fixed.11 But I do not want to make this a definitional part of being a deliberational
decision theorist. I will only demand that one has some well-defined rule for updating one’s
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12 For a function to be continuous its domain and range need to have a topology. If the
credences are distributed over N actions and situations, where N is finite, we can represent a
credence distribution as a vector in an N-dimensional vector space, and use the natural topology
of this N-dimensional vector space. 
13 It does rule out cases where you believe something like this: a perfect predictor
rewards you iff you make a non-trivial mixed decision, e.g. the predictor pays you big bucks if
credences in the light of one’s updated credences in one’s actions, and that this update leaves
invariant one’s (updated) credences in one’s actions. In fact, the updating procedure should not
really be conceived as consisting of two separate updates. Rather, one uses one’s utility
calculation in order to reset one’s credences in ones actions, and one simultaneously adjusts
one’s overall credences ‘accordingly’. As I said before, the most natural way of adjusting one’s
overall credences ‘accordingly’ is to keep fixed one’s credences conditional upon one’s actions,
but I do not want to make this a definitional part of being a deliberational decision theorist; I will
only demand that one has some well-defined rule for what it is to change one’s overall credences
‘accordingly’. 
Second clarification. Will there always be equilibrium credences?  Yes, given certain
mild assumptions, there will always be equilibrium credences. Suppose that one’s updating rule
is continuous, i.e. that any continuous variation in the credences to which one’s updating rule is
applied induces a continuous variation in the updated credences. Slightly more formally: an
updating rule is a function U from credence distributions over actions and situations to credence
distributions over actions and situations. The demand for continuity is just the demand that this
function U be continuous.12 This is a very mild demand. It will be satisfied if one updates 
credences in actions are via an expected utility rule, and if one then updates one’s overall
credences by holding one’s credences conditional upon one’s actions fixed.13  Next let us
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your final credences in your actions are not all 1 or 0, and pays you nothing if your final
credences are all 1 or 0. In fact, I have only been considering cases in which you believe that
what the predictor does depends on how you act, rather that on your (final) credences. I can in
fact allow for predictors whose actions depend on the decision maker’s (final) credences rather
than on his acts. What I can not allow, while retaining the necessary existence of equilibria, is a
discontinuous dependence of the predictors actions on one’s credences. Luckily such a
discontinuous dependence of the predictors actions on one’s credences can plausibly be ruled
out. For it is very plausible that the dynamical laws of our world are continuous, and  no physical
system whose dynamics is continuous could implement such a predictor. 
14 A space is convex if the line between any two points in the space is in the space. A
space is compact if it is closed and bounded.
15 In order to be able to define what it is for a credence distribution to be an equilibrium
distribution, we will need to assume that even though a perfectly rational person never actually
uses any update rules to update his credences during deliberation, there still are facts about what
these update rules are, or rather, should be. For otherwise we do not have enough structure to
define what his equilibrium credences are.  
suppose that the set of possible actions is finite, and that the set of possible situations is finite.
Then the action probability space and situation probability space will be finite dimensional,
convex and compact.14  Brouwer’s fixed point theorem says that any continuous map M from a
finite dimensional, convex and compact space to itself must have at least one fixed point, i.e.
there must be at least one point x in the space such that x=M(x). So, assuming continuity of the
update rule, it follows that there must be at least one equilibrium credence distribution. 
Next clarification. Must one really model a rational person as a deliberator who changes
his credences during the deliberation? No, one need not. Indeed it is a little bit awkward to do so.
After all, if one is ideally rational, then how could there be any stage at which one has the
‘wrong’ credences? So, as long as we are idealizing, let us simply say that a rational person must
always be in a state of deliberational equilibrium. The dynamical model of deliberation that I
gave can be taken to merely amount to a crutch to make us realize that there always exists a state
of deliberational equilibrium.15 
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Final clarification. What if there is more than one deliberational equilibrium? If one took
the dynamical model seriously it could be the case that the equilibrium state that a rational
person ends up in would depend on his starting point, i.e. his initial credences, and the exact
form of his update rules. Moreover, it could be that he ends up in an equilibrium state which has
lower utility associated with it than some other equilibrium state. This would seem a bit
unfortunate for an ideally rational person. However, given that I have just suggested a non-
dynamical model, I now suggest adding the rider that an ideally rational person is always in an
equilibrium state such that there is no other equilibrium state which has higher utility. That is all
there is to deliberational decision theory.  Now let me turn to game theory.
10 Deliberational decision theory and game theory
Let me start by sketching game theory very quickly and superficially. A game is a situation in
which each player has to decide which act to perform, and what payoff each player gets depends
on which acts all players perform. It is common knowledge what the payoffs are for each
combination of acts. A Nash equilibrium is a set of mixed decisions, such that no player can
benefit by unilaterally deviating from his mixed decision. One can show that there are always
Nash equilibria in the same way that I argued that there always are deliberational equilibria. The
standard game theoretic account of rationality is that rational players must play their part of a
Nash equilibrium. But prima facie there are problems here: which one? The Nash Equilibrium
with highest expected utility for one player need not have it for the other players. Moreover, it
can be that each player plays their part of a Nash equilibrium, but if they play their part of
different equilibria the set of mixed decisions might not form a Nash equilibrium. Call this the
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coordination problem. Set it aside for now.
Now let me explain how to get standard game theory from deliberational decision theory. 
The basic idea is obvious: in a game one should treat the other players just as one treats states of
nature when making a decision. Here is what will happen given just this basic idea. Each player
starts with credences for all players actions. Each player computes his own expected utilities
given these credences. Each player changes his own credences in his own actions by some rule
that increases credences in actions that have higher utility than the status quo. And each player
then adjusts his credences in the other player’s actions accordingly. Each player repeats this
procedure over and over. Once again, assuming continuity of the update rules, there will be
equilibrium credences for each player. Suppose that each player ends up with a set of
equilibrium credences such that for each player there are no equilibrium credences with a higher
expected utility for that player. Will a combination of such equilibrium credences form a Nash
equilibrium? Well, they may or may not. It all depends on the credences that the players start
with, on the utilities associated with sets of actions, and on the exact update rules that they use.  
However, let’s modify our assumptions a bit and see where it gets us. Suppose that all
players start with exactly the same credence distribution over the actions of all players, and
suppose that this credence distribution is such that there is no correlation between the actions of
the players, i.e.  suppose that initially this credence function Cr is such that 
Cr(player A does act Ai, player B does act Bj,....., player N does act Nk)= 
=Cr(player A does act Ai)xCr(player B does act Bj)x.....xCr(player N does act Nk)
Suppose, moreover, that each player is a deliberational decision theorist and each player knows
each other players update rule, and each player updates his credences in any other player’s acts
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16 It does not matter whether the players are Deliberational Causal Decision Theorists or
Deliberational Evidential Decision Theorists. The only relevant features of the situation are the
players actions, and we have assumed that there are no correlations between the players acts
according to their credences.
by using the update rule of that player.16 Then one can show that each deliberational equilibrium
is a Nash equilibrium and vice versa (see Skyrms 1990 page 33). Whether the players will get to
a Nash equilibrium in a finite time, and which Nash equilibrium they get to if they do, depends
on the initial credences, and the update rules: the coordination problem is solved by the
assumption of common initial credences and common knowledge of the update rules. 
Now, these are strong assumptions indeed. For various possible weakenings see Skyrms
1990. But we have at least forged an interesting connection between deliberational decision
theory and game theory. 
11 Conclusions
Evidential decision theory violates Piaf’s ‘no regrets’ maxim because there are
information partitions conditonal upon which an evidential decision theorist must violate Desire
Reflection. Causal decision theory violates Piaf’s maxim because there are cases, such as Psycho
Johnny, in which one must regret one’s decision as soon as one has made it. Deliberational
causal decision theory avoids these problems. Moreover, in certain circumstances one can derive
standard game theory from deliberational decision theory. Edith Piaf rules!
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